Correspondence: Debating the Rule of Law in Afghanistan by Bartz, E. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Bartz, E., Momand, K. and Swenson, G. (2018). Correspondence: Debating the 
Rule of Law in Afghanistan. International Security, 43(1), pp. 181-185. doi: 
10.1162/isec_c_00316 
This is the published version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/20514/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_c_00316
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
To the Editors (Eric Bartz and Khalid Momand write):
In “Why U.S. Efforts to Promote the Rule of Law in Afghanistan Failed,” Geoffrey
Swenson’s inaccurate description of one project, the U.S. Agency for International
Development’s (USAID’s) Rule of Law Stabilization—Informal Component program
(RLS-I) (Swenson uses “RLS-Informal”), misrepresents an effective rule of law pro-
gram while missing an opportunity for comparative learning.1 At the core of the issue
is Swenson’s conºation of RLS-I with counterinsurgency projects and approaches—
approaches that RLS-I deliberately avoided. Swenson’s dismissal of RLS-I’s stated
objectives and his selective reliance on sources of varying timeliness, relevance, and ac-
curacy results in the false assumption that the “program’s more pressing goal . . . was to
supplement and consolidate U.S.-led counterinsurgency efforts” (p. 127). This faulty
conclusion serves as the premise for his subsequent analysis, which results in inaccu-
rate assertions and misattributions throughout the article.
Swenson claims that RLS-I assumed the existence of and sought to ªll a post-Taliban
justice vacuum by propping up self-serving, marginally legitimate ªgures to help stave
off an insurgent return. On the contrary, RLS-I’s implementers understood that engag-
ing legitimate practitioners of traditional dispute resolution was not intended to fulªll
these immediate-term counterinsurgency objectives. They knew that a more realistic
goal was engaging existing informal justice mechanisms by ªrst understanding them
and then mitigating their harmful, conºict-inducing practices while supporting—
without distorting—their positive components. Achieving this objective would con-
tribute to long-term stability by increasing respect for rights and the rule of law, thereby
improving dispute resolution services and reducing destabilizing disputes. The pro-
gram’s pre-intervention research, targeted legal education, locally initiated solutions,
and mutual support and accountability among justice stakeholders reºected this un-
derstanding. We were therefore dumbfounded by statements from Swenson that, for
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example, RLS-I “sought to capitalize on the perceived desire of many local actors to
increase their social standing” (p. 128), a trait that, on the contrary, RLS-I’s participant
selection criteria sought to avoid.
Swenson also presumes that an understanding of the local context and how interna-
tional assistance would inºuence communal relations “far exceeded [RLS-I’s] technical
capacity” (p. 128). To ensure quality contextual research, participant selection, program
design, management, and evaluation, RLS-I recruited mostly Afghan national univer-
sity law faculty graduates from—and very familiar with—the regions in which it
worked. These expert staff were advised by expatriates trained in social science re-
search, law, traditional justice, and development. RLS-I did not, however, rely solely on
existing expertise, secondary sources, or outside templates.
RLS-I’s teams designed a pre-intervention qualitative research model to supplement
existing literature and, most importantly, provide nuanced understandings of the
unique challenges to fair and effective justice in each area it worked. In assessing ªfty
program districts, the teams engaged more than 2,000 male and female respondents.
Although each district assessment enabled customization of programming to local
needs, the vast amount of primary data gathered and analyzed provided an in-depth
understanding of broader justice patterns. This knowledge enabled design of a ºexible
intervention model that Afghan partners continue to implement and reªne as the
Afghanistan Justice Engagement Model.2 Contrary to Swenson’s assertions of incompe-
tence and shortsightedness (p. 128), RLS-I’s assessments and integrated mechanisms
for ongoing learning demonstrate a commitment to a thorough and evolving under-
standing of local context and long-term strategic planning.
Through multiple cycles of research, programming, and evaluation, RLS-I under-
stood that a majority of Afghans prefer using traditional justice mechanisms, including
disputant reconciliation, accessibility, speed, and low cost. RLS-I also understood that
key shortcomings of traditional dispute resolution may cause harm and exacerbate dis-
putes. But perhaps most signiªcantly, RLS-I understood that traditional dispute resolv-
ers are embedded in the local culture they serve. To affect change required changing
the knowledge, attitudes, and actions of the constituent components of that culture—
representative leaders and the broader community. RLS-I therefore established partici-
pant selection criteria to reach a critical mass of legitimate male and female dispute
resolvers with sufªcient levels of programming to affect lasting improvements to
dispute resolution practice.
RLS-I maximized available resources in evaluating program effectiveness. It identi-
ªed increased disputant satisfaction with the fairness of dispute resolution processes as
the number of RLS-I participants involved in those processes increased, thereby vali-
dating the program’s strategy of reaching critical mass.3 In addition, USAID’s external
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evaluation noted that 85 percent of female participants “believed that they personally
beneªted through either increased knowledge and/or the increased respect that they
received from male family members after conveying their new legal knowledge,”4 a
glowing result for a primary RLS-I objective: improving respect for women’s rights and
overall status within their families and communities.
RLS-I welcomed valid critique. What Swenson offers is a barrage of misplaced as-
sertions that misses an opportunity for learning and harms an effective development
effort. With greater diligence, including consultation with its implementers and partici-
pants, Swenson would have recognized RLS-I as a long-term stabilization project em-
ploying grassroots development strategies, not immediate-term counterinsurgency
tactics. Acknowledging RLS-I’s actual objectives, strategies, and activities could have
resulted in a section of Swenson’s article on how to avoid nearly all of the pitfalls he
identiªes, rather than a false attribution of them to RLS-I.
—Eric Bartz
Washington, D.C.
—Khalid Momand
Kabul, Afghanistan
Geoffrey Swenson Replies
I thank Eric Bartz and Khalid Momand for their letter in response to my article “Why
U.S. Efforts to Promote the Rule of Law in Afghanistan Failed.”1 Below I address
two main substantive areas of disagreement: the purpose of the U.S. Agency for
International Development’s (USAID’s) Rule of Law Stabilization Program—Informal
Component (RLS-I) and its practical results.
First, Bartz and Momand argue that RLS-I was “a long-term stabilization project em-
ploying grassroots development strategies,” not a counterinsurgency (COIN) program.
This claim is a distinction without a difference, as stabilization is routinely conceptual-
ized as a component of counterinsurgency. Here the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency
Field Manual is instructive: “COIN operations combine offensive, defensive, and
stability operations to achieve the stable and secure environment needed for effective
governance, essential services, and economic development.”2 Indeed, my article ac-
knowledges that RLS-I had numerous objectives, and it provides ample documentation
that counterinsurgency was foundational to its mission (pp. 125, 127–130). Its own per-
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formance management plan explicitly states that RLS-I aimed to “help eliminate
Taliban justice and defeat the insurgency.”3
Second, my article demonstrates that RLS-I failed to promote either the rule of law or
stability and did not meaningfully advance its declared objectives with regard to either
traditional dispute resolution or its relationship to the state justice system. This conclu-
sion does not mean that RLS-I failed to complete program activities or that many pro-
gram beneªciaries did not respond positively. Bartz and Momand consistently conºate
good intentions and detailed procedures with achieving overarching objectives. For ex-
ample, they emphasize the extensive selection process for engaging nonstate actors,
which I acknowledged (p. 128). Despite these efforts, signiªcant information asymme-
tries existed between local communities and program implementers. RLS-I hinged on
ªnding willing collaborators, and those individuals often did not reºect the dominant
local power structures.
As evidence of RLS-I’s success, Bartz and Momand prominently cite its internal pro-
gram evaluation. Yet, they neglect to disclose that this evaluation relied on surveys
where “neither districts nor individuals could be randomized to treatment or control
groups.” Moreover, the authors of the evaluation admit that the assessment relied on
surveys that lacked adequate sample sizes and faced extensive problems with data
quality stemming from security constraints, survey fatigue among respondents, and
unclear questions. They further note, “Unfortunately, the treatment and comparison
groups’ scores on several measures were much different than expected under a random
sampling design, leaving the possibility that estimates of treatment effect are biased.”4
If Bartz and Momand remain skeptical of my assessment, they should review other
high-quality independent analyses of RLS-I’s performance. For example, the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) identiªed serious shortcom-
ings with RLS-I’s management, design, and implementation. SIGAR found that “the ex-
tent to which USAID’s Rule of Law Stabilization—Informal met its objectives cannot be
fully determined because of deªciencies in the program’s performance management
system.”5 Noah Coburn has highlighted RLS-I’s implementation and strategic chal-
lenges and ultimately demonstrated that “internationally sponsored programs attempt-
ing to promote rule of law through the informal justice sector have faced serious
paradigmatic and programmatic challenges that have made these programs generally
ineffective and, at times, counterproductive.”6
In sum, aid implementation is difªcult, important work. I remain deeply impressed
by the RLS-I implementers I met in Afghanistan, as well as practitioners afªliated with
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other programs. While I recognize that program performance is a sensitive topic, I can-
not accept Bartz and Momand’s attempt to obscure RLS-I’s motivations and results. It
is, however, all too characteristic of an aid dynamic in Afghanistan that seeks to justify
and ultimately perpetuate itself rather than ask hard questions about what could be
done better.
—Geoffrey Swenson
London, England
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